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Abstract
While the influence of classical philosophy on sociology has been the subject of several studies, 
less attention has been given to the question of how the founders of sociology viewed classical 
philosophy. This article discusses Émile Durkheim’s account of the historical role of Greek 
philosophy as described in his lectures on The Evolution of Educational Thought. It demonstrates 
how Durkheim makes several erroneous claims concerning Greek morality that, taken together, 
produced a stereotyped image of the Greeks as intellectual giants but moral dwarfs. Downplaying 
the historical role of Greek morality, Durkheim attributes one of the most important social 
facts in connection with the development of Western moral individualism – the inward-oriented 
morality – to the innovative power of Christian religion. Despite this bias, the great twentieth-
century interpreters of social thought, such as Talcott Parsons, Steven Lukes and Robert A. Jones, 
have continually referred to Durkheim’s historical analyses without questioning his assertions. 
Sociologists need to cease citing Durkheim as an authority on moral education in the classical 
world inasmuch as so many of his claims promote a false image of Greek morality and education.
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No longer can the term classical in the idea of classical social theory refer only to the 
founding fathers in the nineteenth century; it must also refer to its more remote origins in 
classical Greece.
(McCarthy, 2003: 13)
The political and moral theories of Plato and Aristotle hardly do more than reflect in 
their systems the political structure of Sparta and Athens respectively.
(Durkheim, 1992 [1950]: 59)
Article
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Durkheim and the question of origin
While the influence of classical philosophy on the foundation of classical sociology has 
been the subject of several studies,1 less attention has been given to the way in which 
classical sociologists viewed classical philosophy. This article describes Émile 
Durkheim’s account of the historical role of Greek philosophy, as explicated in his lec-
tures on The Evolution of Educational Thought.2 Although Durkheim makes a series of 
claims about Greek philosophy that are stereotyped and unfounded, the great twentieth-
century interpreters of social thought such as Talcott Parsons, Steven Lukes and Robert 
A. Jones have referred to these historical analyses without questioning their claims. 
Durkheim’s relationship to Greek philosophy, however, is not only a matter of intellec-
tual history. It is also relevant to sociology as such, since the issue touches directly on 
Durkheim’s understanding of social institutions and the methodological question of 
how to study institutions. The issue further relates directly to one of Durkheim’s most 
central theories, namely that religion held a primacy within the field of sociology with 
regard to all other institutions since it was their point of origin. As for the question of 
the inner voice of moral self-reflection, Durkheim goes a long way – too long, in fact 
– in trying to demonstrate that moral self-reflection originated with the advent of 
Christian religion.
Before addressing the issue, I will first introduce the methodological question of ori-
gin within Durkheim’s work. I will argue that Durkheim treats this question differently 
in his lectures on education than in his main works. I then review the literature on the 
relationship between Durkheim and Greek philosophy in order to set the stage for a spe-
cific case: the historical role of Greek philosophy in the origin of moral individualism in 
Western society. This is followed by a presentation of Durkheim’s account of the rela-
tionship between Christian religion and Greek philosophy. Finally, I assess Durkheim’s 
claims in light of more recent studies of classical philosophy.
Do origins originate?
The question of origin is central to Durkheim’s concept of institution.3 However, his 
oeuvre contains at least two quite different understandings of ‘origin’. In The Division of 
Labour, Durkheim argues that social facts such as the withdrawal of religion, free thought 
and individualism do not begin at a particular time and place in history. Explaining by 
example, he contends that such social facts did not begin with modernity, in 1789, with 
the Reformation, with Scholastic Philosophy or in the Greek polytheism or the Oriental 
theocracies (Durkheim, 1984 [1893]: 121). Being a social fact, he argues, they begin 
nowhere and everywhere within the group sharing the same beliefs. Durkheim seems to 
have preserved this understanding throughout his career, since it is found in The 
Elementary Forms, where he again takes up ‘the old problem of the origin of religions 
but under new conditions’ (1995 [1912]: 7, original emphasis). By ‘origin’, Durkheim 
argues, he does not mean a ‘first beginning’, or a ‘radical instant’, since, ‘[l]ike every 
other human institution, religion begins nowhere’. Rather than radical instants, Durkheim 
is searching for origin as defined by ‘[t]he ever-present causes on which the most basic 
forms of religious thought and practices depend’ (1995 [1912]: 7).
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In his lectures on The Evolution of Educational Thought, delivered during the period 
between his early and his late grand oeuvre, Durkheim holds a somewhat different view 
regarding the question of origin. He is not only much less sceptical as regards identifying 
historical beginnings; he also aims to investigate what he calls ‘les germs initial’, the 
historical embryos, of some of the very same social facts that he was investigating in The 
Division of Labour, such as the origin of moral individualism.
A complete review of the implications of the question of origin in Durkheim’s work 
lies beyond the scope of this article. Instead, I will focus here on Durkheim’s view of the 
origin of the inner voice of moral individualism.
What Durkheim is describing here is the evolution of one of the most central aspects 
of modern institutions, the relationship of man to himself. This relationship is marked by 
a ‘perceptual watchfulness over his own being’, based on the ‘obligation to be examining 
his conscience constantly … to analyse, to scrutinise his motives; in a word, to reflect 
upon himself’ (Durkheim, 1977 [1938]: 283). This attitude was to become one of the 
central objects of study in twentieth-century sociology.4
Greek philosophy and modern sociology
Durkheim’s relationship to classical philosophy has been approached differently in the 
literature. Helen Karabatzaki-Perdiki argues that the relationship may be analyzed in 
four ways: (1) the unacknowledged influence of classical philosophy on Durkheim’s 
thought; (2) the direct references to ancient sources in Durkheim’s work; (3) Durkheim’s 
analysis of ancient societies; and (4) the influence of Durkheim on later studies of ancient 
society and thought (1992: 39).
While citing the direct references to ancient sources in Durkheim’s work, much litera-
ture has claimed the existence of an unacknowledged influence of classical philosophy 
on Durkheim’s thought (Bellah, 1973; Challenger 1994; Karabatzaki-Perdiki, 1988; 
LaCapra, 1972; Meštrović 1982, McCarthy 2003).
These interpretations share the assumption that Durkheim carried out a rethinking of 
the ancient philosophical traditions from the point of view of modern sociology. 
Dominick LaCapra (1972) argued that Durkheim’s sociology should be understood as a 
modern reformulation of ancient natural law; while Stjepan Meštrović (1982) has argued 
that Durkheim stands in the shadow of Plato. This mode of interpretation is also central 
to Robert Bellah’s introduction to Durkheim’s texts on morality and society: ‘It is as a 
philosopher of order that Durkheim stands in the tradition of Plato, Montesquieu, 
Rousseau, Saint-Simon, and Comte’ (Bellah, 1973: xviii); Bellah even argues that the 
influence of ancient philosophy was not only of an intellectual kind. Durkheim used the 
ancient philosophers as models for himself as an intellectual. While summing up 
Durkheim’s attitude towards the role of the intellectual in society, Bellah writes: ‘The 
sociologist today must be what Plato’s Socrates was in times past, the educator of his 
society’ (1973: xxxvii).
The analyses of Durkheim’s relationship to classical philosophy, however, often 
have an interpretative intent that goes beyond the mere question of understanding the 
nature of the relationship. Such analyses may for instance attempt to rescue Durkheim 
from the functionalist tradition of Talcott Parsons. In George McCarthy’s work, 
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Parsons is accused of constructing Durkheim as the founder of sociology as a positivis-
tic science, based upon enlightenment ideas (McCarthy, 2003: 12). And the aim of read-
ing Durkheim through the lens of Aristotle, as Douglas Challenger does, is to correct 
‘the positivistic and functionalistic misreading of Durkheim’ that is attributed to the 
works of Parsons (Challenger, 1994: 14 n. 4). Along the same lines, Meštrović has inter-
preted Durkheim within the fin de siècle context, while accusing Parsons of creating an 
abstract, heartless, cerebral version of classical sociology. Parsons, it is argued, represses 
Durkheim’s criticism of enlightenment (Meštrović, 1991).5 Agreeing with the overall 
argument of Meštrović, both Challenger and McCarthy focus their attention on a differ-
ent kind of neglect: the American neglect to acknowledge the influence of Greek phi-
losophy on sociology. ‘It was the American tradition, and especially the writings of 
Talcott Parsons, which later repressed these [classical] origins in order to transform 
sociology into a utilitarian and positivistic science of explanation, prediction, and social 
control’ (McCarthy, 2003: 2; emphasis added).
McCarthy sums up the argument by stating that classical sociology constituted a 
‘romantic break with the Enlightenment and positivism’ (2003: 170), and that the ‘intel-
lectual and spiritual core of the discipline … its humanistic soul’ was lost in the twentieth 
century. By reinterpreting classical sociology from the perspective of classical philoso-
phy, the intent was to come closer to an adequate understanding of it; hence,
… sociology was viewed by Marx, Weber, and Durkheim as a form of ancient political science 
whose purpose was to examine modern social institutions and values in order to cultivate social 
justice, happiness, and a virtuous life. These are the Greek ideals of phronesis and praxis.
(2003: 13)
Rather than seeking to form a positivistic science, classical sociology should be 
viewed as the ‘formation of a new phronetic science, which was holistic, integrative, and 
classical, and based on the Aristotelian synthesis of economics, politics (law), and ethics’ 
(2003: 13).
Parsons, Lukes and Jones
Several critical points could be made with regard to these interpretations. First, they tend 
to confuse the documentation of an unacknowledged influence of classical philosophy 
on Durkheim’s thought with his analysis of classical philosophy. This distinction is 
important: Durkheim was certainly influenced by classical philosophy, but, as 
Karabatzaki-Perdiki has argued, he ‘tends to minimize the influence of classical culture 
on the formation of modern spirit, overemphasizing the impact of biblical and Christian 
morality’ (1992: 48).6
It may thus not be Parsons who represses the influence of classical culture on 
Durkheim, but Durkheim himself. Reading The Structures of Social Action in this light 
suggests that rather than repressing Durkheim’s analysis of the classical world, Parsons 
seems to pass Durkheim’s views on rather uncritically; much like later scholars, such as 
Steven Lukes and Robert A. Jones, as will be noted. Hence, in his early work, Parsons, 
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discussing the question of origin and the role of Greek philosophy in the formation of 
moral individualism, comes so close to Durkheim’s version that he even passes on both 
of Durkheim’s views on origin.7 Like the Durkheim of The Division of Labour and The 
Elementary Forms, Parsons argues that when it comes to the question of the ‘origin of 
the mode of thinking in terms of the action schema in general’, the search for origins is 
fruitless, ‘since they [the modes of thinking] seem to be rooted in an experience that may 
be regarded as universal to all human beings’ (Parsons, 1949 [1937]: 51). And like the 
Durkheim of The Evolution of Educational Thought, Parsons deals with the question of 
the origin of the inner voice of individualism as an innovation of Christianity rather than 
of Greek philosophical tradition:
Probably the primary source of this individualistic cast of European thought lies in Christianity. 
In an ethical and religious sense, Christianity has always been deeply individualistic. That is, 
its ultimate concern has been with the welfare, above all in the next world, of the individual 
immortal soul. All souls have always been for it, as it were, ‘born free and equal’.
(Parsons, 1937: 53)
And it is this individualism that ‘sharply marks off all Christian thought from that of 
classical antiquity prior to the Hellenistic age’, where we find: ‘[t]he spiritual absorption 
of the individual in the social unit which was self-evident to a Plato or even an Aristotle’ 
(Parsons, 1937: 53).
In his influential work on Durkheim, Steven Lukes devoted a chapter to The Evolution 
of Educational Thought, where the main arguments are presented without any critical 
discussion about their historical adequacy (Lukes, 1985: 379ff.). Robert A. Jones, in his 
detailed study of Durkheim’s social realism, also quotes the same exact passages from 
The Evolution of Educational Thought on the question of conversion and Greek morality 
that I will analyse below, again without questioning their validity (Jones, 1999: 48).
Durkheim’s view concerning the roots of modern education within Judeo-Christian 
educational morality has embedded itself in the academic literature and continues to be 
used in even the most current debates.8
Durkheim and the Greeks: Continuity of naming or explaining?
In order to further explore the question of the continuity of Greek philosophy within 
Durkheim’s sociology, I will introduce the distinction between two types of continuities: 
a continuity of explaining and a continuity of naming.9 We may speak of a ‘continuity of 
explaining’ between modern sociology and classical philosophy, if sociology continues 
the work of explaining social phenomena from within the philosophical tradition (same 
objects, same assumptions).
If sociology, on the other hand, seeks to explain the same phenomena as the philoso-
phers, but does so based on a methodological break with the assumptions of the philo-
sophical tradition, we may only speak of a ‘continuity of naming’, since the sociologist 
seek to explain what the philosophers only have named (same objects, different 
assumptions).
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There is no reason to question the existence of a continuity of naming between classi-
cal philosophy and classical sociology. In the research on the unacknowledged influence 
of classical philosophy on Durkheim’s thought, however, scholars such as Meštrović 
(1982), Karabatzaki-Perdiki, Challenger and McCarthy often imply a continuity of 
explaining. Yet this is done only by downplaying what is obvious – that Durkheim devel-
oped a science on very different terms than the philosophical predecessors. The fact that 
Durkheim was studying institutions and values in order to cultivate social justice, happi-
ness and a virtuous life does not imply that he was not using techniques and methods of 
scientific inquiry unknown to the Greeks. Durkheim was no more a philosopher of phro-
nesis and praxis than a positivistic scientist.
Parsons and Lukes assume that Durkheim is well read within the classical literature, 
but as they are referring to his analysis of ancient societies, they feel no need to suspect 
a continuity of explaining.
Parsons and Lukes basically assume what Durkheim himself assumed: that it was the 
role of science and sociology to explain what the philosophers had only named, such as 
the concept of soul and the duality of human nature. While Durkheim viewed the works 
of Plato and Aristotle as the ‘first attempt at sociology’ because they were the first to 
apply ‘reflection to things of a social order’, they lacked an adequate method in order to 
be viewed as proper sociologists (Durkheim in Bellah, 1973: 3). Plato and Aristotle 
investigated society in order to organize them as perfectly as possible, while the sociolo-
gist studies them ‘simply to know them and to understand them’ (Durkheim in Traugott, 
1978: 71, emphasis in original).
Durkheim’s understanding of his own work on this point has been the object of criti-
cism. Karabatzaki-Perdiki has argued that although Durkheim saw his project as being 
an empirical analysis of the objects of the normative theories of Greek philosophy, he 
himself develops his theories along the exact same lines, thus producing rather than sim-
ply describing new models of the good society. Durkheim’s model, she argues: ‘is also a 
normative model’. This is
… not simply because moral factors are so central to it, but because it represents Durkheim’s 
conception of the ‘good’ society and individual. It has, we claim, precisely the same 
epistemological status as Plato’s ideal models, and each can be judged both in terms of the 
values which it embodies and its sociological plausibility as a possible model of harmonious 
and stable social life.
(Karabatzaki-Perdiki, 1988: 541)
Karabatzaki-Perdiki explains these similarities by demonstrating how an unacknowl-
edged, as well as an acknowledged, influence from classical philosophy has informed 
not only Durkheim’s understanding of the relationship between society and the individ-
ual, but also the functionalistic conception of society (Karabatzaki-Perdiki, 1992: 41). 
While citing the work of Gouldner (1965, 1970), Karabatzaki-Perdiki argues that Plato’s 
metaphysics should be acknowledged as the foundation of not only Durkheim’s social 
theory, but Parsons’ functionalism. Like the modern theories, Plato, it is argued, views 
the different functions of society as a matter of organic relationship.
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Although Karabatzaki-Perdiki demonstrates the existence of a continuity of naming 
between Greek philosophy and modern sociology, the assertion that they have the same 
epistemological status is unconvincing, as this overlooks the immense differences of 
method between the two approaches.10
In order to understand why Durkheim did not acknowledge a possible continuity of 
explanation between Greek philosophy and modern sociology, the perspective needs to 
be turned from the acknowledged influence of Greek philosophy on Durkheim towards 
his own interpretation of philosophy.
Durkheim: In the shadow of religion
It is in his lectures on The Evolution of Educational Thought that we find Durkheim’s 
most complex analysis of the historical role of classical philosophy and Greek antiq-
uity.11 The lectures served as an introduction to pedagogy. However, they contain much 
more than a mere introduction. Durkheim is investigating the origin and evolution of a 
certain type of thought and morality that had come to influence modern society in gen-
eral and modern education in particular. The aim of Durkheim’s historical analysis is to 
approach the acute questions of his time concerning the curriculum of the future.
Durkheim’s argument for approaching these issues from a historical perspective 
reflects his views on the interplay between past, present and future. One cannot approach 
questions about the future curriculum except by evaluating the present. Yet the present 
‘is no more than the extrapolation of the past’, and thus ‘by itself nothing’ (Durkheim, 
1977 [1938]: 15). In order to act in relation to questions of the future, we need a knowl-
edge of the present that can be achieved only by an institutional analysis. This is because 
the future of the institutions, ‘the directions in which they develop, their vigour at various 
stages in their subsequent existence, all these depend crucially upon the nature of the first 
germs from which they originate’ (Durkheim, 1977 [1938]: 19). Based on such herme-
neutical considerations, Durkheim argues for the importance of understanding the rela-
tionship between ancient and modern thought, while assessing the historical implications 
of the different stages of development in between; these development stages include the 
medieval and Renaissance system of education, the realist pedagogy and the influences 
of the Jesuits on French education.
In order to structure this historical account, Durkheim makes a distinction between 
two civilizations: the Greco-Roman and the Christian. According to Durkheim, the edu-
cational focus on nature and the development of logic derived from classical civilization. 
Classical civilization is unique, he argues, since all other cultures begin with the study of 
man, only later arriving at the study of nature and of the world (Durkheim, 1977 [1938]: 
281). Only classical civilization moves in the opposite direction; hence, ‘[a]ll the great 
thinkers of Greece from Thales to the Sophist … were physicists’ (Durkheim, 1977 
[1938]: 281).
While the Greeks viewed man from the perspective of sacred nature, ‘Christian civi-
lization developed in the reverse direction.’ With Christianity, ‘it is the mind … which is 
regarded as sacred.’ This is because ‘the soul, this principle of our inner life, is a direct 
emanation of the divine. As for the world, it is … something profane’. Based on this 
account, Durkheim makes the claim that the Greeks, even Socrates, saw the human mind 
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as having a profane character, while the world was viewed as sacred (1977 [1938]: 
281–282).
According to Durkheim, the evolution of educational thought thus develops from 
being preoccupied with things – the preoccupation of classical civilization – towards a 
preoccupation with human nature and the mind in the medieval age. In the Renaissance 
and humanist movements, the study of man becomes the study of the classical age 
(Renaissance), and of language in itself (the humanists). It was with the development of 
science, secularization and the realist movement within pedagogical thinking that the 
two great civilizations finally converged towards a modern mode of education.
In the following, I discuss Durkheim’s argument concerning the role of Christianity 
and the Greeks in relation to the historical origin of moral individualism.12 While 
Karabatzaki-Perdiki has already begun this work, pointing to several historical biases in 
The Evolution of Educational Thought, 13 further investigations are necessary.
Durkheim’s argument: Philosophy versus Christianity
When it comes to the modern understanding of the school as an institution, according to 
Durkheim, it is generally believed that the school should ‘provide a morally cohesive 
environment which closely envelops the child and which act on his nature as a whole’ 
(1977 [1938]: 30). This belief, Durkheim argues, could only have originated within a 
Christian culture, where education is viewed as a matter of ‘a general orientation of the 
mind and will’. In Greek culture, on the other hand, education was viewed as a matter of 
acquiring ‘certain specific abilities or habits of the mind’ (1977 [1938]: 30). It was 
Christianity that provided the moral framework of individual accountability that was 
necessary for the development of the institution of the school as a moral environment. 
For Durkheim, education as a general orientation of the mind is a Christian innovation in 
more than one sense: it was with the rise of Christian morality that this idea was con-
ceived, and it was with the development of the Church that this notion of education 
became organized.
Durkheim, however, does not stop with a simple distinction between two types of 
morality and education. He also analyses the historical interplay between the two cul-
tures: since the origins of the Church were ‘Greco-Latin’, Durkheim points out, the 
Church ‘could not but remain faithful to its origins’ (1977 [1938]: 21). In order to com-
municate its central ideas and feelings, the Church had to educate and preach, and in 
order to do this, it needed a culture, ‘and at this time there was no other culture than the 
pagan’ (1977 [1938]: 23). Herein lies the dilemma of Christianity: The Church was 
dependent on a culture whose ideas ‘conflicted with those which were at the basis of 
Christianity’ (1977 [1938]: 25).
While the Church was dependent on the culture of the Greco-Latin world, it offered 
something back to the people of that world, namely a ‘moral consolation which they 
could not find elsewhere’ (1977 [1938]: 21); while adapting its ideas and practices to the 
languages and thinking of the Greco-Latin world, Christianity offered a completely new 
way of conceiving man as a moral subject. The morality of ancient Greece, Durkheim 
argues, was oriented towards external competences. The innovation of Christianity was 
to orient the moral consciousness of man towards the unity of his person.14
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Habitudes or habitus? The aim of education
From the French text, Durkheim’s argument may be summed up by referring to the dis-
tinction between ‘habitudes’ and ‘habitus’ (unfortunately, this distinction disappears in 
the English translation). Durkheim distinguishes between a Greek and Roman morality 
with their education based on several ‘habitudes’, and a Christian morality and education 
based on a single ‘habitus’. According to this distinction, the innovation of Christianity 
was that it generated a system of morality based upon a moral unity within the 
individual.
In antiquity, neither morality nor education was directed towards any such idea of an 
inner whole. Rather, ancient education, based as it was on an externally defined virtue 
ethics, was aimed at
… the passing on to the child of a certain number of specific talents. … It was a question of 
inculcating in the pupil certain portions of knowledge and modes of behaviour. … Of dressing 
it up in a kind of external suit of armour, different pieces of which could be forged quite 
independently.
(Durkheim, 1977: 28)
It is here, in the French text, that Durkheim uses the distinction between habitudes and 
habitus; thus arguing that education in antiquity was based on the idea ‘d’inculquer à 
l’élève telles habitudes, telles connaissances’ (Durkheim, 1990 [1938]: 36–37; emphasis 
added). Christianity, on the other hand, ‘consists essentially in a certain attitude of the 
soul, in a certain habitus of our moral being’ (Durkheim, 1977 [1938]: 29; emphasis in 
original).15
Durkheim uses this proclaimed innovation of Christianity to address his audience of 
future teachers directly, demanding that they, too, should aim at the unity of person 
(1977: 37); and that ‘it is this more profound condition which we must get at if we are 
truly to do our job as educators’ (1977 [1938]: 28). This assertion continues to appear in 
contemporary debates on French education.8
Structurally related to the habitudes/habitus distinction concerning the inward rela-
tion of the self is another distinction concerning the relation of society towards the child. 
According to Durkheim, the Christian moral educational system was structured towards 
a defined common goal, whereas in antiquity, ‘there was no common motive or goal’ 
(1977 [1938]: 28).
Conversion: A Christian invention?
According to Durkheim, it was Christianity that turned education from being based on hav-
ing no common goal and inculcating different habitudes towards the common goal of 
developing a single moral habitus within the pupil. In order to back up this claim, he argues 
that it is within Christianity that we first see ‘the emergence of an idea which was totally 
unknown in the ancient world [que l’Antiquité a totalement ignorée] and which by contrast 
played a substantial role in Christianity: the idea of conversion’ (1977 [1938]: 29).16 
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Durkheim defines ‘conversion’, or, more precisely, ‘true conversion’ (‘La vraie conver-
sion’), in the following way: ‘… a profound movement as a result of which the soul in its 
entirety, by turning in a quite different direction, changes its position, its stance, and as a 
result modifies its whole outlook on the world’ (1977 [1938]: 29).17 Through the invention 
of conversion, Christianity changes education from being a matter of acquiring a certain 
amount of true beliefs or knowledges towards moving ‘the deepest recesses of the soul’, in 
a way that is ‘concentrated towards one and the same goal’ (1977 [1938]: 29).
In the phenomenon of conversion, Durkheim identifies the very idea of modern edu-
cation, namely the conversion of the soul towards the demands of society.
The notion of duty
By pointing to education and morality as a matter of converting the deep recesses of the 
soul, Durkheim bolsters his argument that the modern notion of duty was undeveloped 
until the advent of Christianity. Thus, according to him, the notion of duty
… was unknown to the moralists of Greece and Rome [Les moralists … l’avaient ignore] or, at 
any rate, they only had a very vague and flimsy notion of it; for there is no term or locution 
either in Greek or in Latin which corresponds to the concept of duty.
(Durkheim 1977 [1938]: 209)18
Rather than being a matter of duty, morality for the Greeks was a matter of following ‘a 
seductive ideal’. Only with the development of Christianity did morality become a matter 
of following the imperative demand of an absolute law. What Durkheim here attributes to 
Christianity is central to the understanding of the phenomenon of morality as such in 
Durkheim’s work.19 According to Durkheim, morality is the inner voice commanding 
respect for societal rules, and it was with Christianity that this inner voice originated.
By forming these two distinct types of morality, Durkheim has acquired the method 
for analysing the evolution of educational thought, since he is able to identify the strug-
gle between an outward-oriented, goalless aesthetic and an inward, goal-oriented holistic 
morality, throughout the history of education. Whenever education is oriented towards 
Greek and Roman ideals, it has a tendency towards a formalistic, virtue-oriented show-
off, based on external competences and egoistic motives. When education is based on 
Christian values, it tends to develop into a serious, inward, duty-oriented holistic affair. 
This may be summed up in Table 1.
Table 1. Durkheim’s theory of the two types of moral orientations.
Attention Conversion Orientation Goal Morality Notion 
of duty
Object Claim
Greek 
and 
Roman
Partial/Habitudes No Outward No 
common 
goal
Egoistic No Things Local
Christian Holistic/Habitus Yes Inward Common 
goal
Altruistic Yes Man/
Mind
Universal
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Durkheim’s view of the Greeks in other works
Having summed up Durkheim’s argument, it is useful to highlight his view of Greek 
philosophy generally and its role in the development of modern individualism in the rest 
of his oeuvre.
Durkheim is outspokenly enthusiastic about the role of the Greeks in the develop-
ment of reason and science. In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, the Greek 
philosophers are viewed as innovators of a new, rational way of reflecting on nature 
and society. However, when discussing the role of the Greeks in relation to the devel-
opment of modern morality, Durkheim is more reserved. In his lectures on Professional 
Ethics and Civic Morals, 20 the philosophers are viewed as conservative on political 
and moral issues. Hence Durkheim’s statement that Plato and Aristotle do little more 
than reflect the political structures of Sparta and Athens, respectively (Durkheim, 1992 
[1950]: 59).
As for the question of morality, Christian religion is viewed as the force of innovation, 
reflecting a whole new morality, based on individualism. Science and philosophy in 
Athens certainly inspired ‘an individualist movement’, but as Durkheim adds, ‘we can-
not say they derived from it’ (1992 [1950]: 59). The historical role of Christianity in the 
evolution of the Western mind is that it was inward-oriented: ‘The Christian form of 
religion [le culte chrétien] is an inward one.’ In Christianity, ‘outward observances’ 
(‘pratiques matérielles’) and ‘external constraints’(‘contrôle extérieur’) are replaced by 
‘inward faith’ (Durkheim, 1992 [1950]: 58).
Related to the previously discussed question of a possible continuity between 
Durkheim and the Greeks, it should be noted here that while Durkheim views the Greek 
philosophers as the cultural heroes of modern science, since they invented reason,21 
according to him, the Greeks themselves did not grasp the real nature of their endeavour 
(hence, they were not sociologists). The achievement of Greek philosophy, however 
praiseworthy, positions the Greek philosophers in Durkheim’s interpretation alongside 
religious thinkers; but the Greek thinkers lack the same power of moral innovation that 
came with the Christian religion.
In Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, Durkheim thus defines religion as ‘the prim-
itive way in which societies become conscious of themselves and their history’ (1992 
[1950]: 160); a definition that echoes The Elementary Forms, where religion is defined 
as the means by which ‘individuals imagine the society of which they are members’ 
(1995 [1912]: 227). It is through this lens that he views the Greek philosophers: the 
Greeks were the first to imagine society by the use of rational language.22
But while the Greeks invented the idea of a rational explanation of the cosmos, and 
were thus forerunners of scientific thought and the spiritual heroes of a new era, they 
existed within the traditional societal and religious order of the city-state, and were iso-
lated from a moral, institutional framework that could support their ideas.
Morality and education in antiquity
In the following, I will argue that Durkheim’s account of Greek morality and education 
reproduces some of the common stereotypes of his time; and that he makes several false 
claims about moral thinking in antiquity in order to back up these stereotypes.
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Durkheim’s argument is historically complex; in order to present my argument, it is 
therefore necessary to delve into questions concerning Greek and Christian ethics, his-
tory and education. My argument is that, contrary to Durkheim’s methodological and 
empirical claims, Greek and Christian culture cannot be viewed as two distinct civiliza-
tions; and that the innovation of Christianity – rather than being a moral innovation – lies 
in its ability to popularize moral ideas and organize educational environments.
First, I begin by showing how Durkheim reproduces a stereotype common to the fin 
de siècle, but also that his own teacher, Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, did not share 
this stereotype. I then present a counterargument to Durkheim’s claim that Greek and 
Christian culture can be viewed as two distinct civilizations by drawing on historical 
sources, and by focusing on central ethical notions of Greek philosophy such as paideia 
and the prosoche. Drawing on research on medieval theology, I will demonstrate that 
rather than being two separate complexes of ideas, as Durkheim assumes, the separation 
between philosophy and Christianity occurs rather late in the history of the Church.
After this contextualization of the argument, each of Durkheim’s claims will be dis-
cussed: (1) that the Greeks lacked ideas of ethical holism, conversion or authority; (2) 
that they viewed man as profane; (3) that they had no notion of duty and were generally 
amoral; (4) and that they had no schools.
A fin de siècle stereotype
If we return to the fin de siècle, it was a common stereotype to view the Greeks in the 
manner of Durkheim. The argument that the Greeks had no sense of duty was found in 
popular works such as G. Lowes Dickinson’s The Greek View of Life (first edition, 1896): 
‘The good man’, Dickinson argues, ‘was the man who was beautiful – beautiful in soul. 
… Duty emphasises self-repression; the Greek view emphasised self-development’ 
(Dickinson, 1912: 149–150).
A contemporary of Durkheim, Cecil Fairfield Lavell, viewed it as a commonplace 
‘to say that the supreme weakness of the Greeks was moral’, while praising their ‘intel-
lectual and aesthetic greatness’ (1911: iii). This description captures the structure of 
Durkheim’s argument as presented above; as does Lavell’s next point: this picture ‘is 
rarely questioned’, Lavell goes on, and it is often based on a ‘contrast between 
Hellenism and Hebraism’ that ‘is too often made absolute’. Hence, ‘the Greeks were 
intent on knowledge and beauty: the Hebrews on righteousness and reverence for 
divine law. Yet it is curious to note how little there is to support any such absolute 
contrast’ (1911: iii).
As we have seen, Durkheim makes this exact distinction by referring to Greek and 
Christian civilizations as two distinct first seeds: while Greek civilization expanded on 
the part of intellectual development, it was less developed in terms of moral education. 
In Durkheim’s account, Greek culture was adopted by Christianity. Hellenism was an 
intellectual tool for the justification of Christian morality.
But as we shall see, using Lavell’s words, Durkheim makes the contrast between 
Hellenism and Hebraism too absolute, downplaying the moral aspects of Greek philoso-
phy as such, and the moral aspects that were transferred to Christianity from Greek phi-
losophy in particular.
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Durkheim versus Fustel de Coulanges
Durkheim was well schooled in classical studies. Among other sources, he profited from 
having Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges as his teacher (Lukes, 1985: 58ff.). Durkheim’s 
view of Greek morality, however, was fundamentally different from that of Fustel de 
Coulanges. Similar to subsequent twentieth-century interpretations of the moral revolu-
tion in antiquity, Fustel de Coulanges believed that the idea of an inward morality and 
duty could already be found within Greek philosophy. According to him, it was Socrates 
who loosened the question of duty from its ancient religious roots, promoting a notion of 
duty that was related to the human soul (‘le principe du devoir est dans l’âme de 
l’homme’) (Fustel de Coulanges, 2001 [1864]: 485).
Durkheim’s argument – that the moral theories of Plato and Aristotle hardly do more 
than reflect the political structure of Sparta and Athens, respectively – is not only con-
trary to Fustel de Coulanges’ work but, when evaluated from the perspective of modern 
scholars on Greek antiquity, inadequate. Modern scholars, such as Walther Burkert, view 
philosophy as ‘the most original achievement’, arguing that it meant a ‘change and revo-
lution’ within ‘the static structures of Greek religion’ (Burkert, 1985: 305).
With respect to Christianity, Fustel de Coulanges sees it as a continuation of Greek phi-
losophy, since Christianity first and foremost meant a social transformation that completed 
what had begun at least six or seven centuries earlier (Fustel de Coulanges, 2001 [1864]: 
335).23 The important innovations of Christianity, according to Fustel de Coulanges, are 
that it taught that only a part of man belonged to society, distinguished between private and 
public, and concerned itself with the duty of men separate from the law. Though these 
innovations were of extreme importance for the development of modern individualistic 
morality, they did not constitute a break with Greek morality.
As for the question of moral universality, usually attributed to Christianity,24 Fustel de 
Coulanges seems to interpret it as a development of the religious and moral ideas of the 
Hellenistic world. Thus, he argues that since Anaxagoras, a fifth-century sophist accused 
of atheism, there had existed the idea of a god of the universe who received the homage 
of all men (2001 [1864]: 338).
While Durkheim’s view of Greek morality reflects the stereotypes of his time, his own 
teacher thus seems to have had a somewhat different view. This difference cannot be explained 
simply by the fact that Durkheim is presenting an extremely complex matter for his student, 
which demands didactic reduction. Rather, it is the way in which this reduction is carried out 
that demonstrates how Durkheim structured his understanding of Greek morality.
Platonism for the people
Arguing for continuity between classical culture and early Christianity is not to say that 
there is an identity between them. Greek philosophy was seeking to unite rationality and 
spirituality, whereas Christianity sought a spiritual shortcut past the challenges of ratio-
nality. This is already reflected in the spirit of critique among some of the early converted 
Christian philosophers. As Charles Norris Cochrane has argued, this critique may be 
summed up as a relation between ‘science’ and ‘faith’, a relationship which sometimes 
led Christians to indulge in ‘such extravagant language as to leave the impression that 
their opposition to “science” was an opposition to reason itself’ (1957: 222). Thus 
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Tertullian contrasts the ‘academic wisdom’ of Greece with ‘the simple and uncultivated 
soul’ of Christianity (1957: 223).
The spiritual shortcut used by the early Christians soon came to be regarded as a 
shortcoming. Hence, the Christian philosopher Athanasius argued that the superstition of 
his day was due to the fact that the Christians ‘have turned from the cultivation of the 
mind, rejecting the heritage of philosophy … in order to immerse themselves in mere 
sensationalism’ (Cochrane 1957: 315). Similarly, Augustine, in his work On the True 
Religion, argued that ‘the essential part of Platonic doctrines overlapped with the essen-
tial part of Christian doctrine’ (Hadot, 2002: 251; Hankey, 2003: 217). Thus, ‘Christianity 
has the same content as Platonism: the key is to turn away from sensible reality in order 
to contemplate God and spiritual reality’ (Hadot, 2002: 250–251).
These discussions within Christian philosophy suggest that the central difference 
between Christianity and classical philosophy cannot be represented, as does Durkheim, 
as a question of whether the Greek philosophers lacked morality or spirituality. The cen-
tral question was whether the Greeks – through an excess of intellectuality – made the 
path to knowledge too exclusive. The innovation of Christianity was related not so much 
to the philosophical content of the teaching as to the complexity of how it was presented. 
Christianity could be taught to the masses. Unlike classical philosophy, it was not depen-
dent on the acquisition of knowledge and the cultivation of the self. This point was later 
popularized by Nietzsche, in the statement: ‘Christianity is Platonism for the people’ 
(Hadot, 2002: 252).26
The notion of paideia
In the following we shall examine how Durkheim’s claim about the Christian origin of 
moral educational thought ignores the notion of paideia, which, according to Henri-Irénée 
Marrou, was central to the understanding of education in antiquity. ‘For the Greeks, edu-
cation – παιδεία – meant, essentially, a profound and intimate relationship, a personal 
union between a young man and an elder who was at once his model, his guide and his 
initiator’ (Marrou, 1956: 31). Paideia is important in relation not only to the understand-
ing of Greek education, but also in relation to the understanding of early Christianity.
According to Werner Jaeger, Christianity adapted the notion of paideia from Greek 
philosophy. Beginning with Plato, ‘philosophy had become paideia, the education of 
man. And that was how Origen understood Christianity. It was the greatest educational 
power in history and was essential in agreement with Plato and philosophy’ (Jaeger, 
1961: 65).27 Also, Clement of Alexandria establishes a close link between philosophy, 
paideia and Christianity, as analysed by Pierre Hadot, who argues that not only did 
Christianity view itself as a philosophy, but the tendency was ‘already at work in the 
Jewish tradition, particularly in Philo of Alexandria’ (Hadot, 1995: 128–129).
Not only did the second-century Christians, the so-called ‘Apologists’, view 
Christianity as a philosophy, they ‘thought of it as the philosophy. They believed that that 
which had been scattered and dispersed throughout Greek philosophy had been synthe-
sized and systematized in Christian philosophy’ (Hadot, 1995: 128, original emphasis).
The analysis of the notion of paideia demonstrates that Durkheim may be right when 
he argues that Christianity is able to provide a more unified teaching as well as environ-
ment for education than the Greek philosophies. Moreover, the analysis also shows that 
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the central notions – what Durkheim views as Christian innovations – are Christian inter-
pretations of Greek ideas, which seems to indicate that the success of Christianity was 
due to its ability to systematize and organize – rather than any ostensible innovation in 
the realm of morals.
The servant of theology
If we follow the cited research on ancient philosophy and education, it becomes evident 
that it makes no sense to distinguish between Greek intellectuality and morality in the 
way Durkheim does, since Greek philosophy viewed education as both an intellectual 
and a moral process. It was part of the same project, and it had little to do with philoso-
phy in the modern sense. Ancient philosophy was a way of living according to reason, 
which had both intellectual and moral implications.
In both early Christian and Stoic philosophy, reason is connected to the project of 
attaining the right attitude towards oneself. It becomes an inner voice to guide action, as 
it is found in the Stoic attitude, the prosoche. According to the prosoche, the individual 
should be ‘on the lookout for signs within himself of any motives for action other than 
the will to do good. … The “attentive” person lives constantly in the presence of God … 
joyfully consenting to the will of universal reason’ (Hadot, 1995: 130). Hence, when 
Durkheim speaks of the development of man’s ‘perceptual watchfulness over his own 
being, based on the obligation to be examining his conscience constantly… to analyse, 
to scrutinise his motives; in a word, to reflect upon himself’ (Durkheim, 1977 [1938]: 
283), it may be argued that he is referring to a form of relationship of the self to the self 
that derives from classical philosophy and unfolds in both the Stoic movement and early 
Christianity; and was taken over by later movements within the monastic Middle Ages.
According to Hadot’s argument, it was due to the transformation that philosophy 
underwent in the scholastic theology of the medieval university that education and phi-
losophy lost their character of being a way of life (Hankey, 2003: 199). Instead, philoso-
phy became ‘the servant of theology’ (Hadot, 2002: 255).
On first sight, this argument seems to be in line with Durkheim’s assessment of the 
role of Greek philosophy as an intellectual instrument for Christian spirituality. However, 
the crucial point here is when Christian spirituality reduced philosophy to its servant. 
Durkheim works from the assumption that it is from the very beginning, while the evi-
dence indicates a much later development. Durkheim’s statement that Christianity 
needed a culture, and therefore turned to classical philosophy, makes the presumption of 
the existence of two distinct civilizations acting upon each other. In contrast, we argue 
that it was two versions of the same civilization. Consider Wayne Hankey’s argument, 
summing up Hadot’s research:
… so thoroughly was the self-understanding of the ancient schools, as well as their structures, 
aims, and techniques taken into Christianity, that [Christianity] represents itself as the true 
philosophy. Episcopal curiae resemble philosophical schools; ancient and medieval monasteries 
identify their practice of Christianity contra mundum as philosophia and preserve essential 
features of philosophy as a way of life which has been lost to us.
(Hankey, 2003: 198)
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As Jean Leclercq – whom both Hadot and Hankey cite – states in his classical study on 
the subject:
In the age of medieval monasticism, just like in antiquity, philosophy did not designate a theory 
or a mode of knowledge [manière de connaître] but a lived wisdom, a mode of living in 
accordance with reason: that is, in accordance with the Logos.
(1952: 360, my translation)
This focus on ‘lived reason’ – as found in prosoche – remains the aim of education, from 
its development in classical philosophy to a long way into the Middle Ages, when, 
according to both Hadot and Leclercq, this understanding of philosophy was repressed 
by ‘the mediaeval scholastic idea’. However, according to Hankey, later studies have 
shown ‘how the ancient idea of philosophy was retrieved by the lay intellectuals of the 
Middle Ages and Renaissance’ (2003: 199).
According to Hankey, it was not until Thomas Aquinas that philosophy became the 
servant of theology. Aquinas’ point of departure is the Aristotelian philosophy that had 
become known through the Arab philosophers. ‘Thomas followed both [the Arab philoso-
phers] and his Augustinian predecessors by distinguishing between the modalities of faith 
and reason.’ According to Hankey, however, ‘[f]or the first time in the Latin Middle Ages’, 
and ‘in opposition both to the Arabs and the Augustinians, Thomas made a humbled but 
quasi-autonomous philosophy into the servant of revealed theology’ (2003: 219).
Taken together with the evidence for the continuity of Greek philosophy within the moral-
ity and education of the Latin Middle Ages, the fact that the distinction between faith and 
reason – subordinating reason to faith – was used only after the introduction of Aristotelian 
philosophy in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries calls into question the Durkheimian postu-
late of two distinct civilizations. When Durkheim argues that the Church, from the very 
beginning, was obliged to borrow ‘profane elements’ from classical civilization, he is adopt-
ing a Christian notion of profanity that evolved much later, a notion based on the ability to 
separate the element of sacred faith from the profane instrument of reason (Durkheim, 1977 
[1938]: 25). Durkheim thus reduces classical culture to a reservoir of profane, linguistic and 
intellectual skills used by Christianity, rather than interpreting Christianity as a continuation 
of classical culture, where reason was related to spiritual truth and moral models for living: 
reason was a way of living and thus a moral as much as an intellectual project.
The ‘Hellenocentric’ perspective
The conclusions of Leclercq, Hadot and Hankey resemble those of Jaeger, who also 
argued that Christianity turned to Greek philosophy in order to find the intellectual tools 
that could justify its belief. However, Jaeger also asserted that Christianity took shape 
while developing as a philosophy. To support this claim, he points to the fact that the 
Christian idea of mission took form by adapting the ‘classical rhetoric of protreptic, the 
art of speech used to persuade students to a specific education’, that ‘the word “conver-
sion” stems from Plato, for adopting a philosophy meant a change of life in the first 
place’, and that Christian missionaries ‘borrowed their arguments from these predeces-
sors’ (Jaeger, 1961: 10). Even the notion of dogma (δόγμα) derives from the Hellenistic 
schools, where dogma denoted the philosophical knowledge that was advanced; and the 
Bjerre 375
concept of Church, ekklesia, derives from the Greek notion of polis.28 The Christian 
spiritual communities known as ekklesia developed as the Greek polis religion was col-
lapsing, and a new structure of ‘megalopolis’ developed (Burkert, 1985: 337).
It may be argued that Jaeger is as eager to demonstrate the ‘Hellenocentric’ origin of 
modern morality as Durkheim was Judeo-Christian-centric. However, Jaeger’s evidence 
poses a challenge to Durkheim’s theory of two distinct ‘initial germs’.
Contemporary scholars such as Burkert support Jaeger’s claim that the ‘intellectual 
struggle between Christianity and the classical world … required a common basis’, and 
that this common basis was ‘the Greek philosophical tradition’ (Jaeger, 1961: 10–11). 
Burkert thus argues that since Plato, ‘there has been no theology which has not stood in 
his shadow. … Since Plato and through him, religion has been essentially different from 
what it was before’ (Burkert, 1985: 321–322).
Contrary to Durkheim, Dickinson and other fin de siècle scholars, who view Christianity 
as a distinct civilization, Christianity is interpreted by Jaeger, Hadot and other twentieth-
century scholars as a movement within the Hellenistic world. The novelty of Christianity 
was its ability to popularize ideas and cause social transformation rather than to introduce 
a whole new form of inward morality.
We may therefore offer the preliminary conclusion that Greek philosophy played a 
much more central role in the origin of the inner voice than assumed by Durkheim. With 
this preliminary conclusion as our point of depature, we will now discuss Durkheim’s 
claims in more detail. The first claim concerns the status of the education of the whole man.
Greek holism
Evidence against Durkheim’s claim regarding the lack of Greek holism can be found in 
the work of Marrou, who demonstrates that ‘Classical Greece wanted education to con-
cern itself with the whole man’ (1956: 219). As a discussion of the Greek notion of edu-
cation, paideia, may show, it is wrong to state – as Durkheim does – that Greek education 
was externally oriented: that is, aimed at inculcating different pieces of knowledge and 
skills. According to Plato, paidiea meant bringing quite different elements of education 
into a harmonious whole; intellectual education should be seen as one element along 
with the training of the body (γυμναστική) and mousikē (μουσική), as Plato argues in The 
Republic (376e).
Central to the Greek paideia was the question of how to bring these different elements 
into the right combination, in order to achieve the right balance. In a dialogue with 
Socrates, Glaucon thus acknowledges that ‘excessive emphasis on athletics produces an 
excessively uncivilized type, while a purely literary training leaves men soft’ (Plato, The 
Republic, 410d). It is by the harmonic adjustment of the different parts of the soul that a 
man becomes virtuous, reflecting the Greek conception of the self-controlled man 
(σοφóς).
This notion of balance is directly related to an idea of holism. In the dialogue, Socrates 
thus argues that man should bring together the different parts for the benefit of the whole 
(Plato, The Republic, 442c). Rather than being focused, as Durkheim puts it, on dressing 
the student up ‘in a kind of external suit of armour’, Plato lets Socrates argue that man is 
educated when he has bound the different elements of the soul ‘into a disciplined whole, 
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and so become fully one instead of many’; only then will he ‘be ready for action of any 
kind’ (παντάπασιν ἕνα γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σώφρονα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον, οὕτω δὴ 
πρά ττειν ἤδη) (Plato, The Republic, 443e).
This view on education was central not only to the educational thought of Plato, but 
also to that of Aristotle, Isocrates and others. In his Sens lectures, Durkheim himself 
mentions the holistic concept of the soul found in Aristotle: ‘As Aristotle says, we live 
not by one faculty but with the entire soul’ (Durkheim, 2004 [1884]: 59). Isocatres argues 
that physical training and philosophy should aim at forming a synthesis, since the aim of 
education isn’t knowledge as such, but rather the ability to judge within the practical situ-
ations of everyday life:
Once they [the teachers] have acquainted them [the students] with these matters [physical and 
philosophical skills] and brought their knowledge of them to a state of perfection … [t]hey 
force them to link together in practice the various lessons they have learned.
(Joyal et al., 2009: 101, emphasis added)
This notion of a harmonious linkage of the different skills is related to the moral 
idea of tying together the different parts of the soul. This is based in the idea of a sepa-
ration of the body and the soul. As the philosophical movement developed, this prob-
lem became more and more important. In Cicero – and the Stoic movement – the 
problem of the harmonious whole occupies a central role. The notion of the beauty of 
the soul that according to Dickinson proves that the Greeks were not moral philoso-
phers relates to a notion of beauty achieved through the development of a harmony 
within. It is not a mere aesthetic question, but related to ethical standards of the good, 
as well as to social ideals.
This clearly demonstrates that Durkheim’s distinction between habitudes and habitus 
is erroneous; and that there is no support for Durkheim’s claim that the idea of holism is 
a Christian innovation. The aim of the Greek paideia was as much the habitus of the 
child as it was a matter of decorating the child with unrelated habitudes.
Education and conversion
In the following we shall demonstrate that, contrary to Durkheim’s direct claims that the 
Greeks were ignorant of the notion of conversion, and that conversion was an invention 
of Christianity, the opposite seem to have been the case. The Christian notion of conver-
sion derived from Greek philosophy, where it was related to the idea of paideia. As 
Diskin Clay has argued:
… our very words ‘education’ and ‘conversion’ go back to Socrates’ allegory, which tells how a 
fettered prisoner is turned around by a philosophical conversion and let out of the cave. … For 
education (educatio in Latin) is ‘leading out,’ and ‘conversion’ (conversio in Latin) is turning 
around.
(Clay, 2000: 231; cited in Ward, 2011: 86)
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According to Plato’s account of paideia in The Republic, education is not a matter of 
adding something to the mind that was not there before, as if adding sight to the eye. 
Rather, it is a matter of the very act of turning the eye that is already there around (Plato, 
The Republic, 518d). The mind, ‘the organ by which [man] learns’, according to Plato, 
‘is like an eye which cannot be turned from darkness to light unless the whole body is 
turned [ὅλῳ τῷ σώματι στρέφειν]; in the same way, the mind as a whole [ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ] 
must be turned away [περέιακτέον] from the world of change’ (Plato, The Republic, 
518c).29
Again, Plato’s focus is neither on an exterior armature, nor on particular parts of the 
soul, but on the soul as such. Education is now viewed as an effort to turn the whole soul 
around (μεταστραφήσεται) (The Republic, 518d). The word μεταστραφήσεται is the futu-
rum indicative passive of the verb μεταστρέφω. Here the passive form denotes that the 
meaning is not ‘to turn about’, but to turn oneself about, as in changing one’s ways. The 
later Christian use of the word ‘conversion’ derived from this philosophical notion 
(Nock, 1933: 179). In the Christian New Testament, the word ‘μεταστραφήσεται’ is used 
to denote change from sunlight to darkness (Acts 2:20), whereas the reference to conver-
sion (in Acts 15:3), is made by the word ‘ἐπιστροφή’, denoting a turning about.30
The centrality of conversion in Plato’s philosophy of education clearly disproves 
Durkheim’s claim that the Greeks were ignorant of this notion. This is despite the fact 
that it could be argued, following Burkert, that we are dealing with different types and 
degrees of conversion. In relation to the later mysteries, Burkert has argued that ‘even if 
they supposed a change in orientation when an individual turns to worship’, it does not 
have the same meaning as the Christian conversion (1987: 14). In relation to the famous 
story of Apuleius on the initiation of Lucius to Isis, Burkert argues against A.D. Nock, 
asserting that this is not a real conversion, since it does not ‘result in withdrawal from the 
world and worldly interests’ (1987: 17).
In connection with this it must be remembered that Burkert is not talking about phi-
losophy here, but about the mystery cults; and that the Platonic philosophy, as argued 
above, contains a clear notion of turning away from worldly interests. Second, contrary 
to Burkert’s argument, we argue here that conversion cannot be defined as the turning 
away from worldly interests. This is only one type of conversion among others.
Types of conversion
As argued by Nock, it is ‘the reorientation of the soul of an individual’ that is the defining 
trait when we are talking about conversion. It is not the question of the way in which this 
reorientation is shaped, but the presence of the personal experience ‘that the old was 
wrong and the new is right’ (Nock, 1933: 7). Withdrawal from the world is one common 
type of conversion, and certainly not the only type.
This discussion of different types of conversion suggests that not only are Christianity 
and the philosophies both concerned with conversion, it is the same type of conversion, 
namely the withdrawal from worldly interests, as a means of subsequently acting in the 
social world on a different background. Both Christianity and philosophy were oriented 
towards putting knowledge obtained by withdrawal from the world to use within the 
world. This fact is perfectly demonstrated in the allegory of the cave, where the 
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withdrawal from the world is seen as an educational process seeking to correct one’s 
understanding of the world so as to enhance one’s ability to ‘act rationally either in pub-
lic or private life’ (Plato, The Republic, 517c).
Summing up, we may say that conversion to philosophy as a way of life was a serious 
matter. It was a question not just of decorating the mind with certain ideas, but of acquir-
ing principles and knowledge to live by. The Greek philosophers were hardly ignorant of 
conversion; on the contrary, conversion stood at the very centre of the philosophical 
movement. Hadot concludes: ‘To live in a philosophical way meant, above all, to turn 
toward intellectual and spiritual life, carrying out a conversion which involved “the 
whole soul”’ – which is to say, the whole of moral life’ (2002: 65).31
Long before Plato, the Greeks had known conversion-like decisions; 32 and from its 
emergence in the Pythagorean and Orphic movements, through the rhetoric and philo-
sophical movements to popular movements such as Epicureanism and Stoicism in the 
Hellenistic period, conversion seems to have been a central theme in Greek reflections 
on ethics and education.
The profanity of man
The question of conversion sheds a different light on Durkheim’s claim that it was only 
with the advent of Christianity that the mind came to be regarded as sacred. Durkheim 
insists that in Greece, ‘the human mind … was regarded as something profane and of 
little value’ (1977 [1938]: 281).
In order to assess this claim, we need to investigate how the notion of the soul was 
perceived by the Greeks. According to Gabor Katona (2002), the Greek notion of the 
soul developed in several stages, beginning with ‘a fragmented, multi-soul-word descrip-
tions of Homeric man’. The pre-Socratic philosophers unified ‘man’s perceptual-cogni-
tive-emotive acts in a more coherent concept of psyche’ that was fully developed in the 
Socratic notion of the soul; since with Socrates, the idea of psyche is conceived of ‘as a 
unified core of behavior, a representative of the entirety of the person after death, and an 
antagonist of the body’ (Katona, 2002: 39).33
There are different views on when the notion of the division between σῶμα and 
ψυχή appears for the first time. Nevertheless, around 500 bc it is known from the 
Pythagorean tradition. Within this tradition, there existed different versions of the soul, 
ranging from materialist to spiritualist (Katona, 2002: 38). According to Bruno Snell 
(1953), Heraclitus (about 500 bc) was the first to write on the soul as an entity opposed 
to the body. By the soul, Heraclitus denoted a deep, intangible waterish inner entity 
that in itself is undiscovered (Heraclitus, n.d.: Fragment 42), thus implying the need 
for self-examination (n.d.: Fragment 101), as well as the possibility of growth 
(n.d.: Fragment 45).
Related to this evolution of the notion of the soul is the idea of its immortality, the 
question of self-awareness, and the virtue of caring for the soul.34 The Greek preoccupa-
tion with the soul included the idea of the divinity of the soul; hence the doctrine of sal-
vation of Pythagoras, as well as the ‘Orphic’ salvation, are connected with the idea of 
freeing the soul from its imprisonment. Plato, who studied both Heraclitus and Pythagoras, 
accepted this division; in Timaeus, he thus argues, that ‘God created the soul before the 
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body and gave it precedence … and made it the dominating and controlling partner’ 
(Plato, Timaeus, 34).
Plato viewed the ψυχή as the immaterial principle of life, the self-mover. However, as 
E.R. Dodds pointed out, Plato was too realistic a thinker not to confront the question of 
‘psychological conflict (στάσις)’ (Dodds, 1951: 213). This conflict is explained by the 
division of the soul in The Republic and the allegory of the charioteer in ‘The Phaedrus’. 
As Katona writes in summing up the issue of different version of the body–soul relation-
ship within Plato’s work:
According to Dodds, the soul-concept emerging in the Phaedo was the result of the Socratic 
synthesis of two separate traditions: the idea of the detachable occult self of shamanistic 
tradition and the idea of a rational soul (nous) of Socrates’ ethical reflections. [Hence, the] 
struggle between body and soul in the early dialogues reappears as an inner struggle between 
different parts of the soul in later dialogues.
(2002: 40)
Aristotle in his On the Soul, argues against the soul/body distinction, asserting that the 
soul is the cause and the first principle of the living body (‘παντάπασιν ἕνα γενόμενον ἐκ 
πολλῶν, σώφρονα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον, οὕτω δὴ πρά ττειν ἤδη’) (415b). Aristotle thus 
refuses to ‘identify the soul with the intellect’ or ‘restrict the realm of the soul to mental 
operations. Soul, as the first actuality of the body, was also the principle of life’ (Katona, 
2002: 42).
The question of profanity and divinity of the soul cannot be settled by this statement, 
since divinity is not a quality of the soul as much as a potential of it. Divinity is achieved 
through the perfection of the soul. Cochrane (1957) observes that according to Aristotle, 
the human psyche ranks between god and beast. When corrupted, it produces ‘the sem-
blance of a beast’, but as the rational part attains a certain degree of perfection, it may 
‘deserve the epithet “divine”’ (Cochrane, 1957: 111).
As we have seen, although there did not exist a single clear understanding of the soul, 
Durkheim’s claim that the Greeks viewed the human mind as something profane and of 
little value makes little sense in light of massive counter-evidence. From the time of the 
Pythagoreans onward, the Greeks had a notion of ψυχή that – though perceived as a 
problem – was viewed as potentially divine, related as it was to rationality, immortality 
and godlike spiritual realities.
The notion of duty
In concluding this assessment of Durkheim’s representation of Greek morality and edu-
cation, let me return to his claim that the Greeks did not have any clear notion of duty. 
This claim, as we have seen, is part of a fin de siècle stereotype. Today, however, it is 
generally accepted that the Greeks in fact had a notion of duty, albeit not identical to our 
modern notion of it (as found in the Protestant notion of Pflicht).
Within the Stoic movement, we find the term ta kathēkonta, ‘usually translated as “the 
duties”’ or as ‘appropriate actions’ (Hadot, 1998: 188). These ‘appropriate actions’ may 
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be interpreted as ‘social and political obligations linked to human life in a city’ (Hadot, 
1998: 190), such as to marry and to take part in political life, but also – as I have already 
argued – they are related to one’s attitude (Hadot, 2002: 134).
Anthony A. Long translates ‘performing appropriate acts’ as connected to doing what is 
demanded by reason (1986: 190). Contrary to modern ethics, such as that of Kant, the Stoic 
conception of reason was connected with the achievement of happiness, rather than mere 
Pflicht and Wille. Long observes that Kant was indeed inspired by the Stoics (1986: 208).
Long’s argument seems to support Durkheim’s assertion that it was with Christianity 
that the idea of duty developed, since the argument implies that in order to be able to 
speak of duty, we must have a spiritual reality that commands men to act against their 
own needs and feelings of happiness. Only this type of command, according to Durkheim, 
can give rise to ‘the idea of man rising above his nature and freeing himself from it by 
taming it and subjecting it to spiritual laws’; duty is thus connected with the notion of 
going against one’s own nature. According to Durkheim, the Greeks had no impetus to 
go against their nature since they tended to view nature as ‘a source of information about 
the laws of life’ (1977 [1938]: 209).
Based on this distinction, it becomes quite clear why Durkheim attributed the origin 
of moral individualism to Christian religion, since it is with the idea of raising man above 
the nature within himself and making him act in accordance with reason and collective 
defined rules – rather than merely following one’s nature – that he achieves moral auton-
omy. The problem, however, is that while it is true that the Stoic philosophers – such as 
Cicero – viewed nature as a source of ethics, this does not imply that ascetic practices 
were not widespread in Greece. As argued by Michel Foucault, it is wrong to view the 
Greek art of living in relation to the search for happiness without acknowledging that one 
cannot learn ‘the art of living, the techne tou biou, without an askesis’ (1984: 364). It was 
an integral part of classical Greek thought that ‘the “ascetics” that enable one to make 
oneself into an ethical subject was an integral part… of the practice of a virtuous life’ 
(Foucault, 1985: 77). The idea of raising man above the nature within himself is related 
to the Greek notion of happiness, since in order to be happy, one had to act in accordance 
with something other than the mere ‘natural impulses’, namely reason and other collec-
tive defined rules.
While the Greeks did not use the concept of duty in a direct sense, as in Pflicht, there 
are several reasons to contest the argument that they had no clear notion of duty. First, 
the absence of a noun that translates into ‘notion of duty’ does not rule out the possibility 
that other grammatical forms could have operated as a translation. W.H.S. Jones clearly 
shows that while the concept of ‘duty’ did not exist as a noun in Greek language, the 
verbal form of doing one’s duty was well developed in classical Greece in exactly the 
form Durkheim is implying when he defines duty as the act of raising man above 
the nature within himself and making him act in accordance with reason and collectively 
defined rules.
If we regard the voice of duty, … as a call to subordinate the lower instincts to the higher, then 
it must be admitted that the Greeks had a keen sense of duty, and felt an obligation, not only to 
fulfil a law of harmonious development, but to an external divine power, which, however, was 
believed to be working for the good of the world.
(Jones, 1906: 114)
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Second, the notion of duty can also be deduced from the Greek epics and tragedies, not 
to mention Greek philosophy, where examples of duty-like feelings and efforts abound: 
hence, when ‘Achilles considers death a fit penalty for his having failed in his duty to his 
friend’, when ‘Oedipus is driven to blind himself by the discovery of the sin which he has 
committed’, and ‘Antigone willingly sacrifices all, even her life, in her devotion to the 
great unwritten laws’ (Jones, 1906: 114), we are dealing with acts based on a feeling of 
obligation to a set of rules by which one is compelled, rules derived from the authority of 
the divine powers. Where these examples are all based on a mythological interpretation, 
we find a different but related case of moral obligation within the philosophical tradition 
in the trial against Socrates. What makes Socrates so important here is that he embodies 
the definition of ‘true virtue’ given by Durkheim himself, namely a behaviour where 
‘one externalizes some inner part of oneself’ (Durkheim, 1977 [1938]: 208). Morality, in 
Durkheim’s own sense, is being true to one’s inner voice, in so far as it corresponds to 
the authority of either divine command or rational justification. According to Durkheim, 
the religious system of the command of God is the model from which evolved the mod-
ern acceptance of the command of reason.
Socrates versus Abraham
In the following, I will use the trial of Socrates to dispute Durkheim’s claim that the 
intuitive, inner voice first arises with Christianity. As we shall see, something very simi-
lar already existed in Greek philosophy, although its relationship to rationality was very 
different than the inner voice of the Judeo-Christian religions, as will be shown by com-
paring the story of the trail of Socrates with the story of God’s call to Abraham.
The command of God within the Judeo-Christian tradition was decoupled from reason. 
In contrast, Greek thought – while accepting the inner voice – committed it to critical 
examination by the use of reason: ‘When a visitation of the daimonion occurs … Socrates 
knew that X is a command from the infinitely wise god’ (Vlastos, 1991: 285, original 
emphasis), but such a command did not lead to blind action. Rather, it caused Socrates to 
stop and reflect, searching for a meaning that would satisfy not only a transcendent, intui-
tive calling but also the slowly evolving structure of the mind as a rational order, avoiding 
inconsistencies.
Vlastos compares the reaction of Socrates to God’s command with Abraham’s reac-
tion to the structurally identical Old Testament story of Abraham’s sacrifice of his son 
Isaac. Here Abraham is commanded: ‘Take thou thy son… and offer him as a burnt offer-
ing’ (Vlastos, 1991: 285).
According to the story, Abraham would have indeed sacrificed his son had the angle 
of god not stopped him. Socrates, however, would use a different method: he would stop 
himself, stop action and begin reflection. The difference is that Abraham ‘could have 
taken, and did take, the surface content of the sign he got from God as its real meaning’. 
Socrates, being a philosopher, could not do that. A calling to philosophy was different 
from a religious calling, since it was rationally oriented. Socrates’ notion of ethics was 
both intuitive and rational. He conducted himself according to ‘examination’ of his own 
life: that is, through conscious deliberation and reflection. However, Socrates knew – in 
accordance with his rational life – that his own conception of rationality was limited in 
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relation to knowledge and rationality as such, which was the realm of truth that he expe-
rienced intuitively as the voice of God, or his daemon – and that he therefore should be 
open to this voice.
Socrates and the concept of moral duty
In order to explain the case of Socrates, Durkheim – in his reply to objections made to 
his 1906 lecture on ‘The Determination of Moral Facts’ – argues that Socrates ‘was 
ahead of his time while at the same time expressing its spirit’ (Durkheim, 1953: 65). 
However, in The Evolution of Educational Thought, Socrates is treated primarily as the 
first philosopher to turn reflection towards the mind itself (Durkheim, 1977 [1938]: 281), 
without discussing the implication of this in relation to Greek morality and the under-
standing of duty.
Socrates’ notion of duty combines the command of a spiritual authority with the com-
mand of reason. In The Apologia, Socrates thus makes it quite clear that a divine power 
commands his actions. He feels that he cannot evade this command. Interpreters have 
connected this fact with the fact that Socrates refused to escape prison. Thus, Hadot 
argues that Socrates ‘prefers death and danger to renouncing his duty and his mission’ 
(2002: 35). Here we are dealing with two notions of ‘duty’: the sense of duty related to 
the laws of the city; and the sense of duty that derives from a higher, spiritual realm. 
These two types of duties are related but not identical.
Contrary to Durkheim’s statement, the Greek understanding of duty at the time of 
Socrates was in no way obscure. In its most elementary form, it was connected to the 
polis and its laws – which again were related to religion. Within the polis, everyone was 
expected to fulfil his duties. Among other things, Socrates was prosecuted for offending 
the gods and breaking the laws of the city. Therefore, Socrates also defends himself by 
arguing that he was doing his duty as a soldier, where he felt bound to the post he was 
assigned by the call of duty. There is a comparison between how he acted as a soldier and 
how he acts as a philosopher; later ‘god gave me a station’, Socrates argues, with ‘orders 
to spend my life in philosophy [τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος (...) φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν ...]’ 
(Plato, The Apologia, 28e).35
Socrates is bound in his call to philosophy, unable to leave his post. Not only does 
Socrates feel that he must submit himself to the powers of the laws of the city and those 
of the divine calling, he feels bound to find a consistency within his life, between his 
actions and thoughts: ‘You will find that throughout my life, I have been consistent in 
any public duties that I have performed and the same also in my personal dealings’ 
(Plato, The Apologia, 33a). I interpret this demand for consistency as indicative of Plato’s 
understanding of unity of the soul.36
This notion of duty – the duty to act as a unity – finds many later expressions. In its 
most extreme form we can point to Durkheim’s contemporary, Jean-Marie Guyau, who 
argues that ‘morality is nothing but the unity of being. Immorality, on the contrary, is a 
splitting up [un dédoublement], an opposition of the different faculties which limit one 
another’ (1905: 109, my translation). Guyau here expresses in precise form the problem 
of Greek morality and duty. To do one’s duty required that one act as a united whole. This 
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unity could only be achieved through rational reflection and required knowledge of the 
laws and customs of society, as well as sometimes even the will of a spiritual calling.
This discussion shows why Greek philosophy, in contrast to Durkheim’s understand-
ing, contains more than just a moral philosophy, but it is a moral philosophy before 
anything else. Greek philosophy is occupied with reason because it demands that reason 
should guide action – while knowing all the corners of the human soul. Socrates stands 
as a great transitional figure in the development of a universalistic philosophical notion 
of duty because he developed the philosophical attempt to form the rules for acting in 
accordance with reason while navigating between the different – often contradictory – 
callings from within (the different parts of the soul) and from without (spiritual beings 
and the laws).
The amorality of the Greeks
I have now assessed Durkheim’s principal claims concerning Greek morality. We can 
conclude that he promotes a stereotyped distinction between a hedonistic, ego-centred 
Greek philosophy, on the one hand, and an ascetic, altruistic religion of Christianity, on 
the other. He makes this distinction explicit, though indirectly en passant, while specu-
lating upon the motives of the Renaissance humanists who engaged themselves in read-
ings of the Greek texts. While Durkheim defines morality as oriented towards patriotism, 
love of humanity, feeling of duty or some ‘generous enthusiasm’, he asks rhetorically 
whether the motives of the humanists were moral, answering bluntly:
Absolutely not. Their motive was an entirely pagan one, one which had been all-powerful in 
classical culture but which was wholly amoral and whose overwhelming influence Christianity 
consequently strove to diminish: for them, the supreme goal was to possess a name which was 
upon everybody’s lips [c’est le gout de la renomée, c’est l’amour de la gloire. Leur but supreme, 
c’est d’avoir un nom qui coure sur les lèvres des hommes].
(Durkheim, 1977 [1938]: 210–211)
Though it is true that the Greeks in the heroic age focused on this type of immortality of 
the name, it is not exactly historically correct to interpret this as amoral. As a sociological 
term, ‘morality’ denotes following rules and adhering to a social group, and thus acting 
altruistically. Adherence to the group may imply the sacrifice of one’s own life, gratifica-
tion or happiness for the common good.
Viewed from this perspective, the Greek motive for gaining reputation was as much a 
matter of following the societal nomos of a warrior society as an egotistically motivated 
striving towards personal gratification. Just as when we arrive at the philosophical age, 
as Karabatzaki-Perdiki accounts, the ‘fear of gaining bad reputation’ seems to have 
played a role, both this fear of a bad reputation and the goal of immortality of the 
name have to do with the ‘consensual conformity to established laws’ (Karabatzaki-
Perdiki, 1988: 126 n. 31); and with the individual effort of conforming to the ideals 
of society. To judge such ideals as amoral just because they don’t conform to the 
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conformity of one’s own morality is a normative judgement rather than a sociologi-
cal claim.
The institutional question: The Greek school
Let us conclude with Durkheim’s final claim: that Greek culture did not have proper schools. 
As Durkheim argues: ‘It had teachers but it did not have schools’ (1977 [1938]: 31).
Since, as already mentioned, the Greek paideia does not meet the modern ideas of 
school, it may therefore be asserted that the Greeks had no schools in the modern sense. 
As we shall see, however, this interpretation is somewhat of an overstatement of the 
facts. The Spartan educational system focused on competences rather than literary 
skills.36 It corresponded to the earliest forms of education in Athens, which emphasized 
the transmission of skills in farming and other trades. With the adoption of the Phoenician 
writing system about 900–800 bc, however, Greek educational practices altered. 
Education came to focus on the learning of letters (grammata). The earliest account of a 
‘school’ is found in Herodotus, who reports from Chios en passant of children (paides) 
learning the letters (grammata) (Joyal et al., 2009: 13–14).
There exist several approaches to the study of Greek education: the classical approach 
of Marrou focuses on the development of the state-sponsored schools, centred on the role 
of teacher, such as the paidotribes, the grammatistes and the sophist.37 The first Greek 
school was a primary school aimed at reading and writing, taught by the grammatistes. 
It began as a form of private elite education but during the fifth century became public. 
A system of education developed that remained relative stable within the whole 
Hellenistic period, when the primary school was followed by a secondary school (12–16 
years) and the so-called ‘rhetor school’.
Laura Ward has argued that Marrou’s focus downplayed ‘other Greek practices with 
educational effects’, since ‘the public display of laws, participation in rites of initiation, 
and symposia are largely left unexplored’; and that both Marrou and other historians 
tend to ‘provide a picture of Athenian education that excludes many of the practices 
that inculcated a sense of democratic and civic values in Athenian youth’ (Ward, 
2011: 17, 24).
With the development of democracy, the learning of letters became more and more 
central, since democracy required that male citizens play a role in the Assembly (Marrou, 
1956: 39; cf. Ward 2011: 18). The Sophist movement developed around the Assembly in 
Athens, aiming at ‘training men in the use of language’ (Joyal et al., 2009: 46).
One of the striking aspects concerning the physical environment of Greek education was 
that it was conducted around a large sports arena (Nielsen, 1993), such as the palaistra and 
the gymnasion. These venues were often – publicly owned – prestigious buildings (Nielsen, 
1993: 79). The primacy of the physical aspect was related to the fact that education here, 
as in Sparta, was a part of military training. Both the curriculum and the architectural 
organization of the gymnasion were transformed as more focus was placed on intellectual 
development; thus, the library moved into the gymnasion (Nielsen, 1993: 79ff.).
As an institution, the gymnasion played a central role in the spread of Greek culture 
and philosophy within the Roman world. However, their curriculum gradually changed. 
The physical and musical parts of the education was lost, if not directly related to military 
Bjerre 385
training; and the focus became the intellectual education in philosophy, literature and 
rhetoric. The Roman Senate, however, on several occasions prohibited the teaching of 
Greek philosophy (Nielsen, 1993: 83).
Durkheim’s claim that the Greeks had teachers but no school is supported by Marrou’s 
focus on the role of the teacher and by Ward’s argument that other informal arenas were 
central in Greek education. In Durkheim’s view, the philosophical schools were more 
part of an intellectual market than a formally organized school system. Though this may 
be viewed as a somewhat reductive claim, it captures the fact that in Greece, the content 
of the teaching was more pluralistic and less systematic than the Christian schools. The 
Greek educational effort did not seek, as did the Christian schools, to create an environ-
ment where the student could escape the profane world outside for a period of time. The 
Greek educational milieu was wholly unlike Durkheim’s reference to the convict and the 
monastic institutions. Yet the fact that Durkheim may be correct in his assessment of the 
plurality of educational forms in Greece only supports our general claim: that the central 
innovation of Christianity was the systematization and organization of moral education 
and not the invention of the ‘inner voice’ as such.
Conclusion
The aim of this article is not to argue that The Evolution of Educational Thought should 
no longer be read as one of the most stimulating sociological books on education. Rather, 
we have argued that in order to appreciate it most productively, a more critical reading is 
necessary. Sociologists need to cease citing Durkheim as an authority on moral education 
in the classical world inasmuch as so many of Durkheim’s claims, as demonstrated here, 
promote a false image of Greek morality and education.
We have shown that Durkheim’s claim that Greek philosophy and Christianity should 
be held as two distinct civilizations neglects the fact that Christianity was the product of 
the Hellenistic world. Durkheim makes several wrong claims in order to support his 
methodological strategy. First, he argues that Greeks were ignorant about the idea of 
conversion; this makes no sense in light of the evidence that the notion of conversion is 
central to the educational thought of Plato and many of the philosophical schools. 
Second, Durkheim’s claim that the Greeks viewed the mind and man himself as profane 
and of little value also makes no sense, since the notion of the divinity of the soul, based 
on a separation of the soul and the body, was common within the philosophical schools. 
Third, Durkheim’s assertions about duty, altruism and spiritual authority being absent in 
Greek philosophy are less concretely assessed, since it is correct that the notion of duty 
as Pflicht is a modern phenomenon. Nevertheless, in antiquity, the notion of duty devel-
ops from the experience of a spiritual reality being in conflict with the desires of the 
body; thus the motive of following the command of spiritual reality and performing acts 
of askesis was well known.
Fourth, Durkheim’s argument that the Greeks viewed education as a process of 
acquiring unrelated habitudes, without having a notion of a moral habitus, ignores the 
whole tradition of Greek paideia – that is, the search for a harmonious whole within 
the student – a tradition attested by the writings of Plato, Aristotle and Isocrates, 
among others.
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While the claims concerning Greek moral education have been rejected, it is difficult 
to make an unambiguous conclusion regarding Durkheim’s claim that the Greeks had 
teachers but no school. None of the evidence reviewed here contradicts Durkheim’s 
overall claim that education within the Christian schools took on a structurally different 
form than the schools of the classical world. The school of the Middle Ages established 
environments of its own, set apart from the profane world outside. However, it is an 
exaggeration to say that there were no schools in the classical world.
Taken together, the false claims or exaggerations provide a stereotyped – if not false 
– image of the Greeks as intellectual giants but moral dwarfs. It is this image that is used 
to bolster Durkheim’s argument that the inward moral orientation of Western individual-
ism originated in Christian religion. Contrary to Durkheim’s argument, we have shown 
that the appeal of Christianity lay not in the novelty of inner self, but in its ability to 
popularize philosophy and systematize and organize a form of living in accordance with 
its principles.
Since Durkheim uses the distinction between classical philosophy and Christianity as 
the structuring principle of the institutional analysis of The Evolution of Educational 
Thought, this may have further consequences for assessing his work. This is certainly a 
question for further research.
It may be argued, as Anne Warfield Rawls has done, that ‘[t]here is a certain arrogance 
involved in reading a classical text and assuming that the reader is able to see contradic-
tions that the writer overlooked’ (Rawls, 2004: 22 n. 27). However, we only show due 
respect to a critical thinker by examining his or her work critically. It is through the criti-
cal analysis that we can fully appreciate the qualities of The Evolution of Educational 
Thought, a work that for many reasons deserves such a treatment. 
The value of the book lies, among other things, in its general method of studying 
educational institutions; its view on the aim of education and the curriculum of the future, 
a view that remains relevant to modern education; and its exposition of Durkheim’s 
views on the role of secondary education, the relationship between theory and practice, 
his views on the need of a new kind of rationalism and its insights into the structure of 
the modern mind. This makes his work most relevant to contemporary debates on the 
education of teachers as well as on the curriculum and role of the school in modern 
society.
This article is also a commentary on McCarthy’s statement that the term classical – in 
classical social theory – must refer to its more remote origins in classical Greece, as well 
as the founding fathers in the nineteenth century. If we are to accept this statement, we 
must also acknowledge that Durkheim’s relation to the classical thinkers was of a dual 
nature: as a philosophical and moral thinker, Durkheim stands clearly within the tradition 
of the Greek philosophers. However, as we have seen, Durkheim himself does not 
acknowledge this. Using the terms expounded earlier in this article, we may conclude 
that while he acknowledges a continuity of naming between classical philosophy and his 
own sociology, he – contrary to McCarthy’s argument – refuses to acknowledge a conti-
nuity of explaining. He refuses to acknowledge the influence of classical philosophy on 
his own thought. More research should be done on this question. Why indeed does 
Durkheim so persistently distance himself from classical philosophy? As we have seen, 
Karabatzaki-Perdiki goes too far in claiming that his theories should be attributed the 
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same epistemological status as Plato’s ideal models. The facts do not support such a 
conclusion because the entire scientific foundation of method and reflection found in 
Durkheim’s sociology was (for good reason) non-existent in Plato’s work.
Durkheim’s own understanding of his work, as well as the most common view within 
modern sociology, is that since his own work had a scientific basis, which philosophy did 
not have, there exists no significant continuity of explaining.
We have thus raised several questions for further study into Durkheim’s intellectual 
formation and the intellectual context within which he was working and teaching. Further 
study can help us understand a central question: how could such a brilliant thinker, so 
well schooled in Greek thought, have overlooked the moral, individualistic and conver-
sion-centred aspects of Greek philosophy?
Notes
 1. In the following I will focus on Bellah (1973); Challenger (1994); Karabatzaki-Perdiki 
(1988); McCarthy (2003); and Meštrović (1982).
 2. The Evolution of Educational Thought. Lectures on the Formation and Development of 
Secondary Education in France is the English translation of the courses L’évolution péd-
agogique en France. The lectures were delivered from 1904 to 1913 (Lukes, 1985: 379) 
and published posthumously, with an introduction by M. Halbwachs, 1938; translated by 
P. Collins in 1977.
 3. In the second preface (from 1901) to Les règles de la méthode sociologique, where sociol-
ogy is defined, Durkheim expresses the importance of the question of origin by arguing that 
sociology is ‘la science des institutions, de leur genèse et de leur fonctionnement’, the science 
of institutions, their origin and functioning (Durkheim, 1988 [1894]: 15).
 4. Sociologists such as Michel Foucault, Nikolas Rose, David Riesman and Anthony Giddens, 
among others, have described the importance of this reflection of the self on itself in their 
accounts of the development of modern morality.
 5. This interpretation of Parsons, as argued by Fish (2004), neglects the element of human emo-
tion in Parsons’ early main work.
 6. In this reference, I will overlook the insinuation made by Karabatzaki-Perdiki that Durkheim’s 
motive was that he was ‘a Jew’. Interestingly enough, however, Durkheim himself uses the 
same type of argument in relation to Montaigne, who ‘stands oddly amongst his contemporar-
ies … (which derives perhaps from his Jewish origins)’ (1977 [1938]: 289).
 7. Later on, Parsons alters his view on Ancient Greece and its relevance for Occidental cul-
ture, while also discussing the role of Ancient Judaism in the development of Occidental 
individualism.
 8. In his thoughts on the crises and a new educational model, Franck Giol thus cites Durkheim’s 
argument that the concern of education is ‘un «changement d’habitus» que l’École avait pour 
objectif de faire advenir chez l’élève’, while using Durkheim’s argument that within the educa-
tion of secular modernity, it is ‘l’histoire de la pédagogie elle-même qui doit être considérée 
comme un processus de sécularisation d’un même projet de «conversion lente»’ (Giol, 2010: 5).
 9. In relation to this question, Anne Warfield Rawls has argued that while Durkheim seeks to 
solve the same problems as the philosophers, he does it in quite another way, emphasizing a 
scientific method. The consequence is that Durkheim studies philosophy as a social fact, just 
like he studies other social facts such as religion. Durkheim, she argues, views philosophers 
such as Plato and Kant as naming, rather than explaining, what they describe (Rawls, 2004: 
99). In a critical response, Susan Stedman Jones has argued against Rawls’ interpretation, 
that Durkheim does not simply treat philosophy ‘as a ‘folk narrative’. Rather, Stedman Jones 
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argues, Durkheim should be viewed as ‘running with a torch handed to him by Kant and 
Renouvier’ (2006: 39).
10. Historians have argued that although the Greeks used the word ‘scientific’, it differed so radi-
cally from modern science that ‘two different concepts are needed; Greek “science” should 
perhaps be designated as scientia’ (Cochrane, 1957: 148).
11. Durkheim’s exact use of concepts such as ‘antiquity’, ‘the writings of the ancients’, ‘classical 
civilization’ and ‘Greek thought’ are somewhat imprecise. Generally, he uses the concept of 
antiquity to denote the pre-Christian era of Greek and Latin civilization.
12. Since Christianity emerges within Jewish society, it is rather strange that Durkheim may 
argue that Christianity ‘stands at the origin’ (1977 [1938]: 18) of any institution, without 
considering the fact that early Christianity was a Jewish phenomenon.
13. According to Karabatzaki-Perdiki, Durkheim argues that Plato was unknown in the Middle 
Ages, while only Aristotle was known (Durkheim, 1977 [1938]: 164). This may be a ‘slip of the 
mind’, says Karabatzaki-Perdiki (1992: 45), but it nevertheless reflects the general bias towards 
Aristotle found in much of Durkheim’s work. Karabatzaki-Perdiki argues that Durkheim was 
more critical towards Plato than towards Aristotle, whom he treated with more respect (1992: 
42). In opposition to Durkheim, Karabatzaki-Perdiki argues that both Aristotle and Durkheim 
owe much more to Plato than is acknowledged in Durkheim’s work (1992: 41, 43).
14. Durkheim speaks of ‘la personnalité dans ce qui fait son unité fundamental … un état pro-
fond’ (1990 [1938]: 37).
15. ‘Le christianisme consiste essentiellement dans une certaine attitude de l’âme, dans un certain 
habitus de notre être moral’ (Durkheim, 1990 [1938]: 37).
16. ‘C’est là ce qui explique l’apperation d’une idée que l’Antiquité a totalement ignorée et qui, 
au contraire, a joué dans le christianisme un rôle considerable : c’est l’idée de conversion’ 
(Durkheim, 1990 [1938]: 37).
17. ‘C’est un mouvement profond par lequel l’âme tout entière, se tournant das une direction 
toute nouvelle, change de position, d’assiette et modifie, par suite, son point de vue sur le 
monde’ (Durkheim, 1938 [1938]: 37).
18.  ‘La principale, celle qui peut être considérée comme la caractéristique de cette nouvelle 
éthique, qui est devenue la nôtre, c’est l’idée de devoir. 
Les moralistes de la Grèce et de Rome l’avaient ignorée, ou, en tout cas, en avaient un 
sentiment bien obscur et bien faible; car, ni en latin, ni en grec, il n’existe de mot qui rende 
l’idée de devoir, ni d’expression qui en tienne lieu. Ils concevaient la morale non sous la 
forme d’une loi impérative qui commande’ (Durkheim, 1990 [1938]: 242).
19. In Moral Education, Durkheim thus argues that morality is ‘a system of commandments’, and 
that ‘at the root of the moral life there is, besides the preference for regularity, the notion of 
moral authority’ (Durkheim, 1961: 31). Lussier sums up Durkheim’s understanding of moral-
ity in the following way: ‘… a moral action implies obeying a rule that commands (a) simply 
because it commands; (b) because there is respect for it; (c) because it appears to be worthy 
of respect’ (2002: 40). That which one respects solely because it is worthy of respect is in 
Durkheim’s terminology that which is sacred (2002: 43).
20. These lectures were given in 1890, 1900, 1904 and 1912.
21. This may be viewed as a Western conceit, since it may be argued that there have existed other 
rational traditions and scientific traditions that predate the Greeks.
22. ‘In our Western world,’ Durkheim writes in The Elementary Forms, ‘only with the great 
thinkers of Greece did logical life for the first time become clearly conscious of itself’ (1995 
[1912]: 438).
23. According to Fustel de Coulanges, Socrates and the Sophist movement stand out as a turning 
point in Greek religion, ethics and notions of duty. Since Socrates, we have ‘separated morals 
from religion’; before Socrates,
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… men never thought of a duty except as a command of the ancient gods. He showed that 
the principle of duty is in the human mind. In all this, whether he wished it or not, he made 
war upon the city worship. … He founded a new religion, which was the opposite of the city 
religion … the revolution which the Sophists had commenced, and which Socrates had taken 
up with more moderation, was not stopped by the death of the old man. Greek society was 
enfranchised more and more, daily, from the empire of old beliefs and old institutions.
(Fustel de Coulanges, 2001 [1864]: 306-307)
Plato proclaims, with Socrates and the Sophists, that the moral and political guide lies within 
ourselves; that tradition is nothing, that reason must be consulted, and that laws are just only 
when they conform to human nature (Fustel de Coulanges, 2001: 307).
24. Christianity developed a notion of God that was not restricted to a single people, but universal 
for all men.
25. Thus Tertullian, in a familiar outburst, was to ask:
’What has Athens to do with Jerusalem, the Academy with the Church? … We have no need 
for curiosity since Jesus Christ, nor for inquiry since the Evangel.’ ‘Tell me’, he adds, ’what 
is the sense of this itch for idle speculation? What does it prove, this useless affectation of a 
fastidious curiosity, notwithstanding the strong confidence of its assertions?’
(Cochrane, 1957: 223)
26. The idea that the innovation of Christianity lay first and foremost in its power of social trans-
formation accords with a view of Christianity from the outside by contemporary observers. 
Hence, Pliny ‘understood Christianity as a “political association” to be forbidden as a pos-
sible threat to the legitimate power of the state’ (Martin, 1987: 125). Durkheim acknowledges 
this fact himself, arguing that ‘Christianity was supremely the religion … of the humble …, of 
the poor whose poverty was both material and cultural’ (1977 [1938]: 21). Burkert has argued 
that the central point in the development of Christianity was that it asked only ‘faith’ of its 
converts, rather than material operations according to traditional prescriptions, the adherence 
to a specific political unity (the polis) or the acquiring of certain knowledge, as did other 
Greek philosophies. This Christian concern for the poor, combined with the ‘inclusion of 
the family as the basic unit of piety’, Burkert argues, and the economic cooperation of the 
Christian ekklesia, was ‘quite uncommon in pagan religion’ (1987: 51).
27. Paideia meant education, not only of an intellectual kind, but of the body (γυμναστική) as well 
as music (μουσική). Not only music, but also every other activity that was related to the Muses.
28. While it is true, as Jaeger states, that the Greek ekklesia was originally related to the assembly 
of the Greek polis, it is questionable whether this meant that ‘the ideals of the political phi-
losophy of the ancient Greek city-state’, as Jaeger argues, ‘entered the discussion of the new 
Christian type of community, now called a church’ (1961: 15). Burkert argues that while the 
concept of polis is adapted by Christianity, the Christian concept of ekklesia ‘had no equiva-
lent in pagan religion’, since it required a different level of involvement, economic coopera-
tion and ‘the inclusion of family as the basic unit of piety. … To educate the children in the 
fear of God suddenly became the supreme duty … the ekklesia became a self-reproducing 
type of community that could not be stopped’ (1987: 51–52).
29. Plato also uses the notion of ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ in 436b of The Republic.
30. Without discussing the difference between the prefix ‘μετα’ and ‘epi’, A.D. Nock relates the 
notion of conversion found in The Republic (518d) to the Christian concept of epistrophe, as 
do other scholars, such as Michel Foucault in his study of Greek ethics. Foucault writes that 
‘the theme of the epistrophē is a typically Platonic one’ (1994: 96).
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31. An example of this type of conversion is the story of Polemo, the third leader of the Academy 
after Plato and Xenocrates: ‘… after a night of debauchery, Polemo entered Xenocrates’ 
school one morning on a dare with a band of drunken comrades. Seduced by the master’s 
discourse, Polemo decided to become a philosopher’ (Hadot, 2002: 98).
32. Hadot emphasizes the inward, holistic nature of the philosophical life, arguing that this orien-
tation towards the soul had even more ancient roots.
The Greeks had known since the time of Homer and Hesiod that it is possible to modify 
people’s decisions and inner dispositions by the careful choice of persuasive words; and in 
the time of the Sophists, the rules of the art of rhetoric were constituted in accordance with 
this tradition. Like spiritual exercises by which an individual tried to influence and modify 
himself, philosophical spiritual guidance utilized rhetorical techniques in order to provoke 
conversion and bring about conviction.
(2002: 217)
33. According to Vlastos, this notion is Pythagorean and Platonic rather than Socratic. ‘For 
Socrates our soul is our self.’ The whole notion of an independent soul lost in the human body 
aiming at returning home is strictly a Pythagorean idea (Vlastos, 1991: 55f.).
34. According to Burkert, the ‘concern for a perfect knowledge of being’ was related to the ques-
tion of ‘being sure of its object and at the same time care for the soul’ (1985: 322).
35. A later translation reads: ‘“God appointed me”, Socrates argues, “as I supposed and believed, 
to the duty of leading the philosophic life, examining myself and others”’ (Plato, 1993).
36. The educational systems of Sparta and Athens reflected two different social systems. The 
Spartan educational system focused on the education of the male child, while also educating 
females. Education of boys was aimed primarily at inculcating the right spirit of toughness 
in order to raise the boy as a professional soldier. However, it also included training in social 
skills and organization (Marrou, 1956: 14). Not much value was placed on literacy, unless 
for practical use (Joyal et al., 2009: 27). And it may be argued that rather than dealing with 
education, we are dealing with an ‘initiation into society’ (Joyal et al., 2009: 16).
37. Whereas Marrou does in fact, like Durkheim, distinguish the Greek educational system 
around the teacher, he, too, points to the creation of ‘a particular kind of moral ideal that 
underlay the whole system of Hellenic education’ (Marrou, 1956: 29).
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